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In the following excerpt from H.G. Wells’s four volume historical narrative, The 
Outline of History (1919), Wells observes a ritual sacrifice through multiple lenses, 
demonstrating how an anthropological perspective can convey to the reader a sense of 
objectivity: 
Away beyond the dawn of history, 3,000 or 4,000 years ago, one thinks of 
the Wiltshire uplands in the twilight of a midsummer day’s morning. The torches 
pale in the growing light. One has a dim apprehension of a procession through the 
avenue of stone, of priests, perhaps fantastically dressed with skins and horns and 
horrible painted masks—not the robed and bearded dignitaries our artists 
represent the Druids to have been—of chiefs in skins adorned with necklaces of 
teeth and bearing skins and axes, their great heads of hair held up with pins of 
bone, of women in skins or flaxen robes, of a great peering crowd of shock-
headed men and naked children…And amidst the throng march the appointed 
human victims, submissive, helpless, staring towards the distant smoking altar at 
which they are to die—that the harvests may be good and the tribe increase. 
To that had life progressed 3,000 or 4,000 years ago from its starting-place 
in the slime of tidal beaches. (Wells 135-136) 
The scene ends with an abrupt break in the narrative, at which point Wells employs an 
alternate frame of reference. His close-up view of human culture widens in scope; 
measured on a cosmic scale of time, against the evolution of terrestrial life, this transient 
moment in human history dwindles to a microscopic point in the universe. By fluctuating 
between modes of viewing, Wells strikes a balance between both lenses, and enables the 
reader to approaches a standpoint of objectivity. 
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Corresponding with each lens is a distinct narrative mode. Wells renders the 
microscopic viewpoint in mythic imagery, transporting his reader “away beyond the 
dawn of history” to an alternative conception of reality in which time and space are 
indefinite. The ambiguity of the setting creates a sense of timelessness for the reader, 
while details such as the “twilight of the midsummer day’s morning,” or the “fantastically 
dressed” Druids evoke an aura of mysticism. The narrative builds as we take notice of the 
torches, the “avenue of stone,” and the creeping dawn, before Wells turns our gaze to the 
humans of the scene. His depiction of prehistoric man incorporates many of the 
stereotypes of contemporary “savages” prevalent in the early twentieth century, from the 
“horrible painted masks” to the “necklaces of teeth.” With a throng of men, women and 
“naked children” as his characters, Wells demonstrates his mythopoeic imagination in 
this fictional rendition of history. He relies on the mythic archetype of a ritual scene to 
probe the underlying ideology that informs human behavior, which, in this scenario, he 
ascribes to motives as fundamental as the success of a harvest or the health of a tribe. As 
the focus of the entire narrative, these most basic human needs demonstrate the 
anthropocentric bias of a narrow lens. 
Wells combats this anthropocentrism, however, by shifting to a telescopic lens, 
through which he situates this example of culture in the context of “progress.” Used in 
tandem with history, the term “progress” implies linear, positivistic development, 
directed towards a teleological end. This conception of historical development is the 
essence of stadial history, a historiographical model popular among anthropologists and 
historians in the late nineteenth century. Stadial history traces the course of human social 
evolution through a series of stages, though which all civilizations must, and do, progress 
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in the same sequence. Lending credence to the theory in the Victorian era was evidence 
of technological progress lying just beneath the Earth’s surface: in the mid-nineteenth 
century, archaeologists had begun systematically uncovering buried artifacts that 
demonstrated a gradual advance towards more and more complex tools and weaponry1. 
Stadial history was thus the premise upon which Wells wrote The Outline of History. As 
Wells explicates in the Introduction to Outline, his text is structured as “one continuous 
narrative,” justified by the theory that “history is no exception amongst the sciences; as 
the gaps fill in, the outline simplifies; as the outlook broadens, the clustering multitude of 
details dissolves into general laws” (Wells vi). Broadening his “outlook” in order to view 
the ritual scene on a cosmic scale, Wells employs stadial history as his second narrative 
form, grafting a sense of order in the final two lines of the passage onto the surreal 
ambiguity of the preceding scene.  
Darko Suvin, preeminent critic of science fiction characterized the structure of a 
Wellsian narrative as the “mutation of scientific into aesthetic cognition,” by which 
science and art become unified (Alkon 44). Wells’s presentation of primitive ritual in The 
Outline of History illustrates Suvin’s argument in his alternation between mythopoeic and 
scientific narratives, and the juxtaposition of opposing viewpoints, in a style that bears 
striking similarities to the writing of another literary giant of the fin de siècle, the 
anthropologist James G. Frazer. In 1890, thirty years prior to the release of The Outline of 
History, Frazer had permanently altered the Victorian consciousness with the publication 
of The Golden Bough, a study in comparative religion that traces the “evolution of human 
thought” to a common origin (Frazer 324). Encyclopedic in length and breadth of 
                                                
1 Kuper, Adam. The Invention of Primitive Society: Transformations of an Illusion. London; New York: 
Routledge, 1988. 
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information, The Golden Bough offered Victorian readers insight into the exotic rituals of 
“primitive societies,” from the Akikuya of East Africa to the Zapotecs of Mexico (429). 
No corner of the globe escaped Frazer’s scrutiny; by 1920, The Golden Bough had 
swollen from two volumes to twelve. Yet despite its length, The Golden Bough remained 
accessible for any reader. Centered on the story of a Roman cult, Frazer interweaves 
vivid prose with the discourse of Victorian anthropology, creating a narrative that 
functions like a suspense plot. Like the ancient rites that constitute this narrative, Frazer’s 
use of mythic imagery inspires a sense of mysticism that lend a distinctly literary feel to 
an otherwise informative text. Yet always, a subtle irony emerges to undermine the 
scene’s mythic quality, and reveal the narrator’s detachment from this point in time and 
space. Consider the following excerpt from Frazer on the Aztecs, whose religion 
compelled them to choose one boy to represent their highest deity in a ritual sacrifice:  
Eagle down was gummed to his head and white cock’s feathers were stuck in his 
hair, which dropped to his girdle. A wreath of flowers like roasted maize crowned 
his brows, and a garland of the same flowers passed over his shoulders and under 
his arm-pits. Golden ornaments hung from his nose, golden armlets adorned his 
arms, golden bells jingled on his legs at every step he took…On the last day the 
young man, attended by his wives and pages, embarked in a canoe covered with a 
royal canopy and was ferried across the lake to a spot where a little hill rose from 
the edge of the water…On reaching the summit he was seized and held down by 
the priests on his back upon a block of stone, while one of them cut open his 
breast, thrust his hand into the wound, and wrenching out his heart held it up in 
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sacrifice to the sun…Such was the regular end of the man who personated the 
greatest god of the Mexican pantheon. (Frazer 608-609) 
The similarity of the two passages is conspicuous. In The Outline of History, Wells 
identifies Frazer as the “leading student of the derivation of sacraments from magic 
sacrifices,” whose insight into the “development of this association in the human mind” 
informed Wells’s concept of ritual sacrifices (Wells 131). But Wells borrows Frazer’s 
technique as well as his content. In Frazer’s passage, details of the boy’s hair and 
ornaments correspond to the masks and necklaces of Wells’s savages, suggesting the 
mysticism of both rites, and prolonging the narrative tension. In a horrifying climax, 
Frazer depicts the boy’s murder, but then abruptly removes himself from the narrative. 
The scene’s dénouement provides no catharsis; instead, Frazer switches out his lenses 
and shifts from a close-up of microscopic detail to a vantage point of comfortable 
distance. This same technique is evident at the jarring end to Wells’ ritual scene, when 
Wells forces the reader to consider the Wiltshire sacrifice and primordial life side by side. 
The writers both convey their detachment from the scene by their use of demonstrative 
pronouns: Wells points “to that” and Frazer to “such…end,” suggesting a gulf of 
separation between the narrator and the episode he describes. This separation provides a 
space to ask questions: has the course of human history been one of progress, or of 
stagnation? What has human culture produced of any value, relative to the passage of 
millennia?  
 In his quest for the meaning of the human condition, Wells found utility in 
Frazer’s anthropological perspective. This perspective is exemplified in the first passage, 
in which Wells takes his reader through a series of roles; from witness to the ritual, to 
 7 
participant, to victim, before finally passing out of the narrative and speaking from an 
alternative, and presumably objective, point of view. From this external space, Wells can 
issue a resounding proclamation on humanity, speaking with the weariness and 
circumspection of someone viewing the whole of human history at once. This was the 
space occupied in the fin de siècle imagination by the Victorian anthropologist, a figure 
whose extraordinary powers of observation and empirical logic enabled him to approach 
any set of norms with the detached mindset of cultural relativism. At least, this was the 
figure of the Victorian anthropologist that James Frazer cut: surprised by nothing, 
skeptical of everything, combining absolute rationalism with keen intuition. Wells’ 
indebtedness to Frazer is evidenced in his histories as well as his novels. The purpose of 
this project is to shed light on this influence and demonstrate the ways in which Frazer’s 
anthropological perspective provided a useful template for Wells to organize the mythic 
and the scientific, creating space for the reader to objectively evaluate humanity’s 
relationship with culture. If successful, this project will draw a firm connection between 
Frazer’s attitude of detachment and cognitive estrangement, the literary device that 
Wells’ developed into a hitherto unseen art form, the science fiction novel. 
In his scientific romances, Wells thrusts his characters into unfamiliar 
environments, where they must reconstruct reality from an objective perspective 
unshaped by cultural dogma. Darko Suvin views this experience as one of cognitive 
estrangement, in which the estranged character confronts a “set normative system…with 
a point of view or look implying a new set of norms” (Suvin 6). Cognitive estrangement 
is the defining feature of the science fiction genre, which Suvin defines as “a literary 
genre whose necessary and sufficient conditions are the presence and interactions of 
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estrangement and cognition, and whose main formal device is an imaginative framework 
alternative to the author’s empirical environment” (8). Suvin acknowledges that 
superficially, this definition of estrangement appears to unite science fiction and myth 
into one genre. However, as Suvin contends, myths assume humanity is locked in a fixed 
state, while SF rejects the absolute, and “sees the norms of any age, including 
emphatically its own, as unique, changeable, and therefore subject to a cognitive view” 
(7). This self-aware subjectivity is a characteristic which Wells himself recognized: in 
“An Experiment in Illustration,” published for Strand Magazine in 1920, Wells states that 
an SF story is meant to elicit the “valid realization of some disregarded possibility in such 
a way as to comment on the false securities and fatuous self-satisfaction of everyday life” 
(Suvin 209). The purpose of science fiction, then, is to subvert traditional views of 
everyday life. This distinguishes science fiction from the 19th century British novel, 
which in Wells’ eyes “was produced in an atmosphere of security for the entertainment of 
secure people who liked to feel established and safe for good” (Bergonzi 196). 
Estrangement defines the narrative structure of Wells’ scientific romances, which 
follow a familiar template: a white, middle-aged male protagonist leaves the familiarity 
of nineteenth century England to arrive, alone, in the midst of an utterly foreign cultural 
climate. His new environment can be spatially or temporally distant, or both; of greater 
significance is the cognitive estrangement the narrator experiences as he ploddingly tries 
to grasp and adjust to a new set of cultural norms. Such was the task, at least, for the 
protagonist of The Time Machine. Published in 1895, Wells’ first novel chronicles the 
adventures of a narrator known only as the Time Traveler, whose powers of deductive 
reasoning eventually unravel the mysteries of humanity in the year 802,701 A.D. Told in 
 9 
retrospect, the Time Traveler’s story begins and ends in the parlor of his London 
townhouse, creating a convenient juxtaposition between the Time Traveler’s original 
context and the Wellsian otherworld of 802,701. The novel begins prior to his departure, 
when the Time Traveler invites a group of friends to his home to announce the viability 
of traveling in the fourth dimension. His first words are exhortative, as he urges his 
guests, who hail from a variety of respectable professions, to dispense with their 
accustomed patterns of thinking: “You must follow me carefully. I shall have to 
controvert one or two ideas that are almost universally accepted” (2). “Controverting” the 
norm is thus an established grounding for his voyage before the Time Traveler even 
departs. His instructions are directed at the novel’s readers as well, who must also 
unshackle their minds from doubt before proceeding. By challenging his guests’ 
ingrained precepts, the Time Traveler compels his companions to gauge reality 
objectively, rather than through the lens of the Victorian bourgeoisie.  
It’s a lesson he adheres to faithfully later on, when he lands among Morlocks and 
Eloi Immediately upon his arrival in 802,701, the Time Traveler experiences a 
disconcerting sensation of estrangement. For him, estrangement corresponds to feeling 
“naked in a strange world,” a vulnerability that “a bird may feel in the clear air, knowing 
the hawk wings above and will swoop” (44). The experience of estrangement is so alien 
to his unproblematic British existence that the Time Traveler compares it to life as a 
different species. Moreover, the experience is distinctly uncomfortable. The Time 
Traveler fears for his safety, recognizing that compared to the advancements of future 
society he may come off as “some old-world savage animal, only the more dreadful and 
disgusting for our common likeness” (44). Comparing himself against an alternate, 
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presumably more progressive culture indicates the Time Traveler’s anthropological 
perspective; in this scenario, however, the British gentleman does not expect the 
comparison to be in his favor. As the Time Traveler becomes more accustomed to the 
future, his old certainties begin to crumble, a process that accelerates when he believes he 
has lost the time machine and is therefore trapped. Estrangement now involves a sense of 
finality, and he describes feeling “hopelessly cut off from my own kind—a strange 
animal in an unknown world” (54). As this new phrasing suggests, it is no longer the 
world that is strange, but he himself.  
The narrator in The Island of Dr. Moreau (1896) is separated from his familiar 
surroundings by distance, rather than time, but his sense of estrangement is no less 
complete. His break with familiarity occurs abruptly: shipwrecked off the coast of Peru, 
Edward Prendrick succumbs to dehydration and delirium after days adrift in a lifeboat, 
before regaining consciousness aboard a new vessel, the Ipecacuanha. Like the time 
machine, the Ipecacuanha conveys the narrator to a point of even further estrangement, 
and its characteristics are similarly fantastic. The ship bears animals as its only cargo, is 
atrociously filthy, and the only human Prendrick sees on deck is a “gaunt and silent 
sailor” (14). Prendrick’s sense of isolation is increased when he meets a creature with the 
most “repulsive and extraordinary face,” leaving him “astonished beyond measure” (14). 
By the time Prendrick arrives on Moreau’s island, he is weak, emotionally drained, and 
primed to experience cognitive estrangement, as he himself admits: “The reader will 
perhaps understand that at first everything was so strange about me, and my position was 
the outcome of such unexpected adventures, that I had no discernment of the relative 
strangeness of this or that thing about me” (31). Emphasized here is Prendrick’s general 
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perception of “strangeness;” although his five senses are not impaired, Prendrick’s abrupt 
immersion into a new environment has reduced his sensitivity to established norms. The 
flippancy with which he dismisses “this or that thing” further implies his detachment 
from his surroundings. 
Though cognitive estrangement is a term unique to the science fiction genre, the 
experience of estrangement in the literary tradition has roots in the “Fantastic Voyage,” 
which Jonathan Swift popularized in 1726 with Gulliver’s Travels.2 Swiss Family 
Robinson added a moralistic bent to the genre in 1812, and in 1863, Jules Verne began 
the first of a fifty-four novel series collectively titled the Voyages Extraordinaires.3 By 
the time Robert Louis Stevenson’s Treasure Island appeared in 1882, journeys to distant 
lands were a standard motif of the nineteenth-century adventure romance. Adding to and 
informing this canon of fiction were the non-fiction counterparts: as British imperialism 
reached its zenith, travelogues and missionary reports from all over the Empire fascinated 
readers with tales of foreign shores and savage tribes. These tales reached the ears and 
eyes of scholars as well as citizens, and made their way into the new academic field of 
anthropology. In 1890, a Cambridge scholar with an anthropological bent named James 
George Frazer consolidated these reports into the first two volumes of The Golden 
Bough. It was a watershed moment for anthropology, and for British culture. Detailing 
religious customs ranging from Classical antiquity to European peasantry to the shores of 
Africa and Asia, Frazer argued that the same underlying principles could be discerned in 
religious beliefs the world over, regardless of culture. Yet despite its encyclopedic-like 
                                                
2 Suvin, Darko. Metamorphoses of Science Fiction: On the Poetics and History of a Literary Genre. New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1979. 
3 Alkon, Paul K. Science Fiction Before 1900: Imagination Discovers Technology. New York : Toronto : 
New York: Twayne, 1994. 	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breadth, The Golden Bough remained exceptionally readable because of its narrative 
structure. Like the travelogues upon which he grounded his theories, Frazer framed The 
Golden Bough as an adventure tale. He painted a portrait of savages roaming untamed 
jungles, of missionaries witnessing gruesome rites, of exploration and danger and travel, 
and the response of his readership confirmed that they themselves felt stirred. Adding to 
this effect was his language. Frazer directly addresses his readers in the attitude of fellow 
travelers, such as at the end of Chapter 1 when he expands the scope of his survey from 
Lake Nemi to the world at large:      
It will be long and laborious, but may possess something of the interest and charm 
of a voyage of discovery, in which we shall visit many strange foreign lands, with 
strange foreign peoples, and still stranger customs. The wind is in the shrouds: we 
shake out our sails to it, and leave the coast of Italy behind us for a time. (21) 
As Frazer makes clear to his reader, this is a journey into the “strange.” He concludes the 
third edition of The Golden Bough similarly, in the voice of a returning traveler: "Our 
long voyage of discovery is over, and our bark has dropped her weary sails in port at last. 
Once more we take the road to Nemi” (808). The reader turns the final page with the 
sense that she herself has experienced a spectacular journey. After accompanying Frazer 
across the globe and analyzing the structure and conventions of innumerable foreign 
cultures, the reader is safely restored to her familiar surroundings. The Frazerian critic 
Mary Beard notes that like the Virgilian branch alluded to in the title, which guided 
Aeneas into the underworld, “Frazer's Golden Bough took the reader into the Other and 
then brought him or her safely back out again” (Beard 222). This immersion into the 
Other, however, is much like the experience of reading science fiction, in that both 
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produce the sensation of cognitive estrangement. Wells and Frazer both employ a 
narrative structure that encourages the reader to acclimate to a new set of norms, with the 
intention that acclimation will lead to greater awareness of cultural relativism.  
Cognitive estrangement is not an end itself, but a means to an end. As a literary 
device, its effect is to make the reader sensitive to a general relativism. Isolated from 
tradition and estranged from cultural context, the self can objectively view its relationship 
to the Other without the constraints imposed by ideology. Understanding the link 
between anthropology and science fiction sheds light on why Wells, a man who studied 
the “hard sciences” under biologist T.H. Huxley, would be interested in Frazer. George 
Slusser and Eric Rabkin frame the link between disciplines in their introduction to Aliens: 
The Anthropology of Science Fiction:  “Anthropos is man, anthropology the study of 
man. The alien, however, is something else: alius, other than. But other than what? 
Obviously man…It is through learning to relate to the alien that man has learned to study 
himself” (Slusser vii). In the two examples of Wellsian science fiction that this project 
addresses, the protagonist grapples with an “alien” culture; The Time Machine features a 
non-human in the form of the Eloi and Morlocks, while The Island of Dr. Moreau depicts 
the Beast Folk. These two types of non-humans provide a point of comparison for Wells’ 
protagonists to evaluate themselves, in the same way that Frazer and the Victorian 
anthropologists looked to other cultures in an attempt to understand their own. A similar 
cognitive process of comparison is central to both disciplines. 
As two distinct disciplines interested in similar cognitive processes, anthropology 
and science fiction emerged out of the scientific movement of the mid-nineteenth 
century, which transformed the pursuit of knowledge in Western Europe and, 
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emphasizing the value of empirical methodology, imposing more rigorous standards of 
research and experimentation. In fields like biology, chemistry, or astronomy, scholars 
could depend on experimentation and replication to lend legitimacy to their results, but 
the logic of empiricism was more difficult to incorporate into the social sciences. Early 
anthropologists and ethnographers instead relied on the comparative method, which 
Frazer described in glowing terms as “a product of that unparalleled analytic or scientific 
activity which in the course of the present century has enlarged enormously the 
boundaries of knowledge” (Hyman 198). One of the earliest Victorian anthropologists 
engaged in this method was Edward Burnett Tylor, the highly respected Reader in 
Anthropology at Oxford University. Tylor advocated the need to improve the 
anthropological method, in order to overcome “a certain not unkindly hesitancy on the 
part of men engaged in the precise operations of mathematics, physics, chemistry [and] 
biology to admit that the problems of anthropology are amenable to scientific treatment” 
(Stocking 4). Yet despite his endorsement of the “scientific treatment,” Tylor’s 
comparative study of religion was largely incompatible with empirical logic or statistics, 
which Tylor dismissed as “a difficulty ever present in such investigations” (Stocking 10). 
Tylor instead drew conclusions by reading ethnographic reports of exotic cultural 
traditions and identifying “adhesions,” his term for the patterns that flouted “the ordinary 
law of chance distribution” (5). In 1871, these adhesions found their way into Tylor’s 
book, Primitive Culture, which, nearly twenty years later, James Frazer would read while 
on vacation in Spain.4  
                                                
4 Stocking, George W. After Tylor: British Social Anthropology, 1888-1951. Madison: University of 
Wisconsin, 1995. Print. 
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Frazer modeled his approach after Tylor, using the comparative method to form 
broad generalizations among diverse cultures based off of secondhand information. 
Often, this involved accepting uncritically the eyewitness accounts of missionaries or sea 
traders, ferried in from the most distant outposts of the British Empire. As his critics have 
long noted, Frazer’s self-avowed appreciation for the scientific method is inconsistent 
with the reality of his research. The critic John Vickery mediates this discrepancy by 
explaining that, for Frazer, science “was perhaps less a refined methodology than a 
general temper and stance toward the nature of knowledge and the conditions of 
ignorance” (Vickery 6). Robert Fraser takes Vickery’s justification a step further in the 
introduction to his 1994 edition of The Golden Bough, in which he argues that because 
“all anthropological accounting of whatever kind partakes of a variety of personal 
testimony,” anthropology is “inevitably a branch of literature” (Fraser xxxii). 
In keeping with the theory of stadial history, Frazer compared between cultures as 
a method of detecting large, overarching patterns governing the development of 
civilization. He does this in The Golden Bough by structuring the text as a narrative. To 
create a sense of continuity, Frazer knew his tale must originate from a platform, upon 
which all of his anecdotal evidence could intersect. He found this intersection in a text by 
Pausanias, which recounted the bizarre customs of a Roman cult situated in the forests 
along Lake Nemi. There, in a sacred grove, a priest of Diana stood guard over a certain 
tree, compelled to wait for the day that a fugitive slave might appear to wrest his title 
from him in a match of deadly combat. The ritual of the King of the Wood was observed, 
Frazer alleges, “down to the decline of Rome,” yet the rite’s brutality seemed, to Frazer, 
“to transport us at once from civilization to savagery” (Frazer 11). Surely, he reasoned, 
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this savage tradition could be attributed to some earlier age, and persisted as a “survival.” 
For, as Frazer points out in his introduction, “Recent researches into the early history of 
man have revealed the essential similarity with which, under many superficial 
differences, the human mind has elaborated its first crude philosophy of life” (12). This 
“essential similarity” is the basic premise upon which The Golden Bough operates. Frazer 
goes on to outline how, through a sequence of inferences, he will eventually confirm his 
original hypothesis: 
Accordingly, if we can show that a barbarous custom, like that of the priesthood 
of Nemi, has existed elsewhere; if we can detect the motives which led to its 
institution; and if we can prove that these motives have operated widely, perhaps 
universally, in human society, producing in varied circumstances a variety of 
institutions specifically different but generically alike; if we can show, lastly, that 
these very motives, with some of their derivative institutions, were actually at 
work in classical antiquity; then we may fairly infer that at a remoter age the same 
motives gave birth to the priesthood of Nemi. 
And thus Frazer begins his exploration into the development of ideology, on the pretext 
of identifying certain universal “motives,” or rational processes, that lead to specific 
human behaviors. 
Like Frazer, Wells wrote The Outline of History under the assumption that one 
can consolidate all of human history into a universal narrative. His introduction reads like 
an echo of Frazer’s, in which he contends that “History is no exception amongst the 
sciences; as the gaps fill in, the outline simplifies; as the outlook broadens, the clustering 
multitude of details dissolves into general laws” (Wells vi). Both Frazer and Wells sought 
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a pseudo-empirical approach to social science, and both anchor their attempts in a 
Darwinian belief in “one general record” that is both linear and positivistic in its 
progression (vi). Moreover, neither makes any effort to conceal his agenda; in the 
obituary he wrote for William Robertson Smith, Frazer explains that comparative 
anthropology “calls for a reconsideration of the speculative basis of ethics as well as of 
theology” (Hyman 199). Wells speaks to the same cultural fixations as Frazer when he 
says, “Our internal policies and our economic and social ideas are profoundly vitiated at 
present by wrong and fantastic ideas of the origin and historical relationship of social 
classes” (Wells viii). Here, Wells is invoking the notion of survivals that first stirred 
Frazer to action. His interest in the origin of social constructs is motivated by a desire to 
purge his culture of its eidolons of the past, just as Frazer explored the origin of 
anachronistic superstition. 
In order to understand these vestiges of an ancient past, Frazer borrowed from 
Tylor’s system of classification, by which Tylor charted “real tribes and nations, past and 
present” along a single scale of cultural development, which he defined as the “absence 
or presence, high or low development, of the industrial arts, especially metal-working, 
manufacture of implements and vessels, agriculture, architecture, &c, the extent of 
scientific knowledge, the definiteness of moral principles, the condition of religious 
belief and ceremony, the degree of social and political organization, and so forth” (Tylor 
26). Whereas Tylor’s historical model follows three stages of cultural development 
progressing from savagery to barbarism to civilization, Frazer classified societies 
according to their belief systems, the laws governing each society’s “association of ideas” 
that consequently determine its position along the stadial continuum. Frazer explains his 
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logic in simple terms in The Golden Bough: “Just as on the material side of human 
culture there has everywhere been an Age of Stone, so on the intellectual side there has 
everywhere been an Age of Magic” (53). Some civilizations may progress at a faster rate 
than others, however, a disparity that explains what the Victorian age perceived as a 
developmental inequality between races. 
Members of Victorian society were fascinated by the concept of primitivism. The 
anthropological historian Adam Kuper details a multitude of reasons for this cultural 
fixation in his book, The Invention of Primitive Society. One reason was the advent of 
anthropology, which arose contemporaneously with evolutionary biology and British 
imperialism. It is common for historians nowadays to relate the beginnings of 
anthropology as a tale of double vision: one eye was trained on the present, the other on 
the past, and the difference between the two was labeled “progress.” At least, this 
characterization applies to the first wave of anthropologists emerging in the late 
nineteenth century, whose theories were bound up in notions of a positivistic, linear 
pattern of social evolution guiding human society towards ever-greater advances. In order 
to advance, however, one must have an initial starting point. At one time or another, a 
form of human society must have developed “first.” And so the idea that all of human 
civilization can be traced back to its moment of conception took root in the earliest 
anthropological frameworks. The concept of primitivism was thus constructed around a 
pedagogic illusion, the so-called primitive society. 
Wells presents three visions of primitive societies in The Time Machine and 
Island of Dr. Moreau, with the Eloi, Morlock, and Beast Folk. In The Time Machine, 
Wells frames the Eloi and Morlocks in a stark dichotomy, with a sunlit civilization above 
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concealing a menacing netherworld below. This contrast recalls Frazer’s metaphor in the 
first volume of The Golden Bough, when he conceives the gradations of cultural 
development as a “solid layer of savagery beneath the surface of society,” comparing 
civilization to a “thin crust which at any moment may be rent by the subterranean forces 
slumbering below” (54). In the future civilization of Wells’ imagining, we see the 
consequences that ensue when Frazer’s words take on a literal meaning, and this 
subterranean threat emerges from below.  
Lurking beneath the superficial beauty of the Eloi paradise, the Morlocks 
represent the only threat to aboveground life, thereby illustrating the danger which thinly 
veiled savagery poses for civilization. Crucial to this depiction is the fact that the 
Morlocks are cannibals, a trait typically ascribed to savages in the tradition of Victorian 
primitivism. Yet if the Morlocks figure as savages in The Time Machine, the Eloi do not 
provide a strong contrast. Uncurious and indolent, the Eloi serve as poor representatives 
of civilization. Instead, the Eloi function as another representation of primitivism, one 
that illustrates the misguided associations of ideas that Frazer ascribes to “savage 
philosophy.” The principle motive for the Eloi’s behavior is their fear of the Morlocks. 
Protecting the Eloi from this real danger is a set of taboos, which, by prohibiting any 
explicit or implicit reference to Morlock existence, serve to perpetuate the Eloi’s 
helplessness.  
The concept of the taboo became a permanent fixture in the nineteenth-century 
British imagination, initially entering Victorian society as tabu, in reference to a 
Polynesian custom Captain Cook observed in Tahiti during his third journey around the 
world. As Cook’s ship log explains, the word taboo was “used to express anything 
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sacred, or eminent, or devoted” (Adler 113). As early as 1826, Sir Walter Scott 
demonstrated the ease with which taboo entered popular discourse: “The conversation is 
seldom excellent among official people. So many topics are what Otahaitians call Taboo” 
(Steiner 113). While Frazer was not the first to introduce the taboo to his countrymen, it 
was he who demonstrated to his Victorian contemporaries that taboo creation is evident 
in all cultures, and furthermore, that this system of enforcing prohibitions is innate to the 
human cognitive process.  
For Frazer, taboos are vestiges of the early years of a society, when it was still 
trapped in the Age of Magic, the first stage in his conception of stadial history. Magic is 
based on principles in the same way science is, but these principles are incorrect, and are 
derived from savages “misapplications of the association of ideas” (Frazer 27). Frazer 
summarizes the underlying basis of magical laws as the false assumption that “things act 
on each other at a distance through a secret sympathy, the impulse being transmitted from 
one to the other by means of what we may conceive as a kind of invisible ether, not 
unlike that which is postulated by modern science for a precisely similar purpose, 
namely, to explain how things can physically affect each other through a space that 
appears to be empty” (27). Yet though the premise upon which magic is based is 
incorrect, Frazer duly notes that savage rituals adhere to these principles with “logical 
consistency, and that the “fundamental conception”(35) of magic is “identical with that of 
modern science; underlying the whole system is a faith, implicit but real and firm, in the 
order and uniformity of nature”(45).  
Magical processes are governed by two separate laws, the Law of Similarity and 
the Law of Contagion. The Law of Similarity regulates homeopathic magic, and operates 
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under the assumption that if one wishes to achieve a desired effect upon an object, then 
one may do so by achieving the same effect upon a similar object. An example of this 
would be the logic behind voodoo dolls. The second law, conversely, functions upon the 
idea that the properties of one object may be transferred to a second through contact, just 
as a disease spreads from one person to the next. This law governs the development of 
taboos, by which sacred objects or people were tabooed because their sanctity was seen 
as a source of power, and power, like an electric current, can be dangerous to anything 
that comes in contact with it. To combat this, taboos serve a prohibitive function: by 
forbidding contact with objects of power, the taboo insulates its magical energy and 
prevents it from transferring to another object. Objects of power can be persons or 
activities, sacred or abhorrent—the quality of the object’s magical energy is not 
important. As Robert Fraser explains in his edition of The Golden Bough, “the emperor of 
Japan was secluded from the world, but so were homicides. ‘Taboo,’ like the Latin word 
sacer which Frazer regarded as a conceptual synonym for it, therefore meant both sacred 
and profane” (Fraser xxiii). In either case, certain actions, behaviors, and even words 
must be avoided to preserve the self’s wholeness. Establishing a taboo is thus akin to 
marking a boundary around the soul. The effect of this boundary is a rigid distinction 
between the self and the external world; in this way, taboos exercise profound control 
over one’s cultural identity, informing each member of a society what constitutes his or 
her self, and what absolutely does not. Explicating the underlying misconception of 
taboos, Frazer states, “if the supposed evil necessarily followed a breach of taboo, the 
taboo would not be a taboo but a precept of morality and common sense” (Frazer 32). By 
virtue of its definition, the rules governing a prohibition do not correspond with natural 
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law. Tabooed objects in Eloi society follow this pattern. When the Time Traveler 
gestures towards the White Sphinx, indicating to the Eloi his wish to open it, they react 
with “horror and repugnance” (Wells 53). His gesture acknowledges the statue’s inner 
sanctum, which in itself is an acknowledgement of the Morlocks’ existence. In 
accordance with the Law of Contact, as Frazer defines it, touching the Sphinx invokes the 
power of sympathetic magic, defiling the body of whoever touches it by creating a bond 
of “sympathy” between the person and the object. The Time Traveler defiles himself by 
hammering upon the Sphinx, and the resulting impurity of his body is reflected in the 
Eloi’s subsequent aversion to him. They watch him “furtively,” unwilling to 
acknowledge him directly, and avoid him in the palace for two days, presumably until his 
contagion wears off. Even speaking of the Morlocks has the same contaminating effect. 
Weena refuses to answer the Time Traveler’s questions, “shiver[ing] as though the topic 
were unendurable” (71). Implicit reference to the Morlocks is intolerable, yet this refusal 
to acknowledge reality circumscribes the Eloi into a space of silence, ignorance, and 
inaction. The frustration the Time Traveler feels when he runs up against this taboo 
corresponds with both Frazer and Wells’ contempt for what they perceived in Victorian 
society as survivals of a primitive past. 
Yet although the Time Traveler violates the Eloi’s prohibition, he is nonetheless 
subject to its governance. When his first gesture towards the White Sphinx is met with 
revulsion, the Time Traveler admits to feeling inexplicably “ashamed” (53). His shame 
demonstrates the power of taboos over the individual, as well as his estrangement from 
his prior set of norms. Here, in his first brush with a foreign taboo, he succumbs to its 
pressure, before he even knows its cultural significance. Once he does make contact with 
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the Morlocks, the influence of the taboo is even greater. At this point in his narrative, 
however, he becomes markedly less reliable. He claims to “loath” the Morlocks 
“instinctively,” but at the same time acknowledges that his aversion is bolstered by his 
prior claims with the Eloi. In a concession to objectivity that savors strongly of Frazer, he 
admits his revulsion is “largely due to the sympathetic influence of the Eloi” (72). 
Sympathetic magic, that contagious force that must be controlled by charms and 
prohibitions, is responsible for infecting the Time Traveler with the Morlock taboo. He 
fears the contaminating effect of their touch, “shudder[ing] with horror to think how they 
already must have examined” him in his sleep (82). Despite the civilizing influences of 
education, despite his bracing claims that he is “differently constituted” and hails from 
the “ripe prime of the human race, when fear does not paralyze and mystery has lost its 
terrors,” the Time Traveler is still subject to a taboo imposed by a culture he does not 
even deign to deem human (82). 
In contrast to the Eloi, the Morlocks obey no taboo system. No laws or 
prohibitions guide or restrain their behavior, which Wells conveys by their transgression 
of an almost universal taboo: cannibalism. As the Time Traveler admits to himself, man’s 
“prejudice against human flesh is no deep seated-instinct” (105). It is rather a prejudice 
imposed by culture—yet the most basic of prejudices which unites nearly every human 
culture. Wells thus employs the presence of taboos as an indicator of the Eloi’s vestigial 
humanity, contrasted with the Morlocks, whose lack of taboos suggests a complete 
departure from the human race. Once culture ceased to exert its normative pressure on the 
Morlocks, and ancient prohibitions fell away, “they turned to what old habit had hitherto 
forbidden” (105). The Morlocks’ internal disregard for fundamental taboos corresponds 
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outwardly in the invasiveness of their behavior. Morlocks prowl the Eloi palaces at 
nighttime, groping unconscious sleepers and examining their bodies. The Time Traveler 
reflects on this intrusion with horror, “shuddering” to think how they have already 
“examined” him. He shudders at the thought of Morlock caresses for the same reason that 
the Eloi do not touch the White Sphinx: Contact with an external object, by the laws of 
homeopathic magic, renders the subject tainted, and, if the object is evil, defiled. The 
Morlocks do not shy away from contact with Others, because their behavior is not 
restrained by taboos. They thus “clutch,” “pluck,” and “feel” the Time Traveler with 
freely moving fingers. There are no cultural fence-posts, no prohibitions limiting contact 
with the external, no physical boundaries that cannot be transgressed. 
In The Island of Dr. Moreau, the taboo system reinforces the Beast people’s dread 
of Dr. Moreau’s vengeance, which they perceive as divine retribution. “Evil is he who 
breaks the Law,” the Sayer asserts at the gathering in the amphitheater, suggesting that 
for the Beasts, breaking a taboo is an act so perverse it literally defiles the perpetrator’s 
soul. He who breaks the Law is not a mere criminal, but, as Moreau calls the Leopard-
Man, a “sinner” (88). Revered in this way, the Law extends and amplifies the scope of 
Moreau’s control, granting Moreau power over the Beasts’ souls as well as their bodies. 
The relationship between soul and taboo as the Beast people conceive it bears 
striking resemblance to Chapter 11 of The Golden Bough, “The Perils of the Soul.” 
Explaining the purposes of taboo, Frazer states, “the precautions adopted by savages to 
secure [the soul’s safety] take the form of certain prohibitions or taboos, which are 
nothing but rules intended to ensure either the continued presence or the return of the 
soul” (153). Frazer elaborates upon this still further in Chapter 4 of Book IV, “The 
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External Soul,” in which he explains that the soul is often conceived of as a “concrete 
material thing of a definite bulk” (756). Existing an object of matter, the soul can 
therefore escape the body, but it can also be forcibly extracted. According to one of 
Frazer’s anecdotes in Chapter 11, a certain chief of considerable political as well as 
magical ability removes a criminal’s soul as punishment for refusing to confess. 
Additionally, Frazer teaches, “the soul is commonly supposed to escape by the natural 
openings of the body,” such as the eyes. Thus when the Leopard-Man breaks the taboo 
against eating meat, a prohibition which allegedly safeguards his soul from corruption, 
Moreau “look[s] into the eyes of the Leopard Man, and seem[s] to be dragging the very 
soul out of the creature” (91). The Beasts understand the soul as a physical object, which 
subsequently can suffer physical harm. Noting the parallel between the Beast Folk’s 
ideology and Frazer’s assertion, that “the conception of an external soul is one which has 
had a powerful hold on the minds of men at an early stage of history,” it is further 
demonstrated the extent to which Wells modeled his Beast Folk after the “early societies” 
of The Golden Bough (757). Prendrick uses this logic to his advantage in the wake of 
Moreau’s death, when the Beasts are questioning the validity of their belief system. 
Moreau’s body may be gone, Prendrick argues, yet Moreau “is not dead” (103). Although 
he has “cast away [his old body] because he ha[s] no more need of it,” his soul lives on: 
“He is…there…where he can watch you. You cannot see him. But he can see you. Fear 
the Law” (103). Prendrick capitalizes on the Beasts’ belief that the soul is an animate 
object. Moreau’s taboos are so deeply ingrained in the Beasts that despite evidence of his 
death, the Beasts’ belief system remains intact. 
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Wells viewed taboos as the foundation of every religion, and saw humans’ 
affinity for establishing prohibitions further evidence that religion is derived from natural 
human thought. In this way, Wells speculated, cultures develop as well, as humans 
“systematize” their beliefs to “establish a common tradition of tabus of things forbidden 
and things unclean” (OOH 130). The process by which human thought gives birth to 
religion, and from there, constructs a culture, was powerfully suggestive for Wells. He 
described the relationship between culture and religion as follows: 
The history of mankind henceforth is a history of more or less blind endeavors to 
conceive a common purpose in relation to which all men may live happily, and to 
create and develop a common consciousness and a common stock of knowledge 
which may serve and illuminate that purpose. (134) 
The cynicism of Wells’s statement corresponds with the tradition of dissolvent literature 
The contrasting ideologies of the first and second halves of the nineteenth-century 
underlines the fact that religious decay was in part a reaction to the practices of 
Evangelical Christianity, which by the third decade was suffering a decline in church 
membership5. Serving as a further catalyst were the lecturers in scientific naturalism, men 
like T.H. Huxley and Herbert Spencer, who preached a newly found belief called 
agnosticism. These agnostic scientists gained further credibility as a result of a 
burgeoning interest in biblical history. William Robertson Smith, the man to whom 
Frazer dedicates The Golden Bough, came to fame in the 1880’s from his essays on 
historical inaccuracies in the Old Testament. To the Victorian layperson, an influx of 
information seemed to flood in from all sides, creating a tension between science and 
religion that was difficult for Victorian intellectuals to reconcile. This perceived tension 
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was certainly not lost on Frazer himself. Robert Fraser, the editor of the 1994 Golden 
Bough abridgement, points to a notebook entry from 1885 that reveals Frazer’s own 
ideological grievances: “In our own age as the progress of knowledge has been immense, 
so the breach between religion and science has widened; hence the number of people who 
are seen to be busily employed in endeavoring to fill up this breach” (Fraser xxv).  
Frazer’s discussion of the Age of Religion is the greatest source of controversy in 
The Golden Bough. His critics varied, and continue to vary, between denouncing him as 
the “arch-atheist,” and complaining that his approach was too evasive (Downie 21). The 
changes Frazer made to each edition of The Golden Bough suggest that he too, was 
unsure of his own religious ideology. Theories on the crucifixion of Christ that he 
published in the 1915 twelve-volume edition were later elided from the 1922 
abridgement, a project that he and his wife personally oversaw.6 Certainly, Frazer 
introduces the Age of Religion with a note of appeasement in his narrative voice. He 
concedes that “there is probably no subject in the world about which opinions differ so 
much as the nature of religion, and to frame a definition of it which would satisfy every 
one must obviously be impossible” (46). Yet he plows on to argue that religion is innately 
adverse to the principles of science. If religion is “a propitiation or conciliation of powers 
superior to man which are believed to direct and control the course of nature and human 
life” (46), then this assumes that the “course of nature is to some extent elastic or 
variable” (47). However, this assumption is “directly opposed to the principles of magic 
as well as of science, both of which assume that the processes of nature are rigid and 
invariable in their operation, and that they can as little be turned from their course by 
                                                
6 Frazer, James G., and Robert Fraser. The Golden Bough: A Study in Magic and Religion: A New 
Abridgement from the Second and Third Editions. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2009. Print. 
 28 
persuasion and entreaty as by threats and intimidation” (47). The progression from the 
Age of Magic to the Age of Religion was thus brought about by a recognition of 
mankind’s inability to control external events, and accompanied by a loss of personal 
agency, whereby man’s “old free bearing is exchanged for an attitude of lowliest 
prostration before the mysterious powers of the unseen” (57). From the mournful tone 
with which he envisions this transition between stages, and the negative comparison he 
draws between religion and magic and science, Frazer’s stance cannot be misconstrued. 
Yet it is important to note the absence of a third stage in his overview; having completed 
a summary of the Age of Religion, Frazer stops short without detailing the process by 
which the apex of civilization makes its transition into the Age of Science.  
Frazer was thus no exception to the rule that writers of dissolvent literature both 
reflect and perpetuate a religious anxiety. As suggested by the controversy surrounding 
The Golden Bough, Frazer’s readers were not insensitive to the hint of scorn with which 
he depicts religious observance as a survival of primitive rituals. Magic and religion are 
portrayed as equally fallacious belief systems in The Golden Bough—a coexistence that, 
Frazer implies, casts shame on both type of observer. However one characterizes magic 
and religion, they both fall into the category of the “supernatural,” the “foundation of the 
rites and practices which can be called religious; and it is from the same belief that 
everything which may be called Magic and Witchcraft draws its origin” (50). As Frazer 
endeavors to prove through his “associations of ideas,” religion is the product of human 
thought. This aspect of Frazer’s theory is one that Wells would have found particularly 
compelling. For Frazer, all variations of supernatural beliefs share a common foundation, 
and generations of mankind have only added more and more layers of ideology to this 
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original firmament. Wells makes the point more forcefully in Outline of History, when he 
asserts, “Religion is something that has grown up with and through human association, 
and God has been and is still being discovered by man” (131). Underlying these layers of 
religious growth, then, must be vestiges of a more primitive past, one in which God has 
not yet been discovered. This is the type of world Wells envisions in The Time Machine 
and Island of Dr. Moreau, two novels that each offers a unique conception of religion. 
The effect of each conception is to further estrange the reader in an alien land, deprived 
of the comfort of religious continuity. Grouping Wells with the writers of dissolvent 
literature is therefore an apt classification. Unlike the writers of autobiography or essay, 
however, Frazer and Wells rely on the techniques of detachment and estrangement to 
suggest religious dissolution.  
The future world of The Time Machine is empty of anything resembling religion 
or God. Though the Time Traveler makes no mention of this absence, Wells’ critics 
found it more conspicuous. One unsigned review, published in the Spectator on July 13, 
1895, scoffed at the idea of a godless earth, contending, “We may expect with the utmost 
confidence that if the earth is still in existence in the year 802,701 AD, either the A.D. 
will mean a great deal more than it means now, or else its inhabitants will be neither Eloi 
nor Morlocks” (Geduld 9). This line of reasoning suggests that the reviewer missed 
Wells’ point, as an “utmost confidence” in any cultural belief is exactly what Wells 
endeavors to discredit. It is the same point the Time Traveler makes to his guests, when 
he warns them he will have to “controvert one or two ideas that are almost universally 
accepted” (2). Repeatedly throughout Time Machine, the protagonist calls on the reader 
to reject, or at least reevaluate, “universally accepted” cultural norms, either through 
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direct address like in the opening scene, or via his personal rationalizations about life in 
802,701.  
The relationship between ideology and civilization is even more ambiguous in 
The Island of Dr. Moreau, which probes the development of taboos in the most 
rudimentary forms of society. To ensure their continuing humanness after leaving the 
House of Pain, Moreau sets down a set of rules for the Beast people to obey. These rules 
undergo a radical transformation outside of Moreau’s lab. Through daily ritual, Moreau’s 
prohibitions grow in stateliness until they form the very fabric of the Beast people’s 
society, uniting the Beasts under a religious doctrine they refer to as “the Law.” The 
Beasts’ Law is significant not because it wields such power, but because this power 
develops autonomously. Moreau himself never set outs to incite such devotion—he 
informs Prendrick with disdain that there exists “something they call the Law,” and 
mocks how the Beasts “sing hymns about ‘all thine’” (79). Moreau does not deliberately 
implant the Law into Beast culture; instead, Law and culture develop side by side. 
Through this representation, Wells is suggesting that religion is a social institution that 
develops arbitrarily in human societies, independent of external or supernatural 
interference. Yet Wells is also saying that, despite this lack of interference, religion arises 
because it is a fundamental process of cultural development. Humans naturally possess a 
religious impulse, and this impulse is what motivates groups of humans everywhere to 
conceive of an institution of religion. With its linear development, the Beasts’ religious 
culture mirrors the track of Frazer’s stadial theory, falling, according to Frazer’s system 
of classification, into the category of primitive societies that exemplify the Age of 
Religion. In keeping with this classification, Wells’ portrayal of Beast society contains 
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many Frazerian images, such as the priest, the Divine King, and the taboo, and from this 
society’s dissolution, we can chart the progression man makes from the Age of Religion 
into the Age of Science. 
So great is the Beasts reverence for the Law that a unique social niche is afforded 
to the “Sayer of the Law,” a gray-haired Beast whose principal duty is to “sit in the 
darkness and say the Law” (70). “Here,” the Sayer intones to Prendrick from his seat of 
power in a darkened hut, “come all that be new, to learn the Law” (70). Learning the Law 
is necessary for any new creature’s initiation into the colony. The Sayer has another 
distinguished responsibility: he leads the recitation during group rituals, and when 
Moreau summons a gathering in the amphitheater, the Sayer alone is recognized 
individually. Both teacher and leader of Moreau’s doctrine, the Sayer clearly represents 
the priest. It is during such ritual gatherings that we realize the Law is regarded more as a 
religion than a system of government. Consumed with religious emotion, the Beast Folk 
descend into near frenzy as they perform their rite, sweating and chanting with a 
“rhythmic fervor” that causes Prendrick to fear Moreau has “infected their dwarfed brains 
with a kind of deification of himself” (71). Prendrick’s concern is appropriate: the Law 
indeed symbolizes “His will,” the will of their Creator, whom the Beasts honor as a deity. 
In his depiction and function in the novel, Dr. Moreau mirrors Frazer’s Divine King, a 
figure of archetypal significance to The Golden Bough. As Frazer defines this term, “in 
savage or barbarous society there are often found men to whom the superstition of their 
fellows ascribe a controlling influence over the general course of nature,” who are 
“accordingly adored and treated as gods” (217). Beasts believe Moreau’s power is 
absolute, as their chant illustrates: 
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“His is the House of Pain. 
His is the Hand that makes. 
His is the Hand that wounds. 
His is the Hand that heals 
…His is the lightning-flash…His is the deep salt sea.” (59) 
 To the Beast Folk’s imagination, Moreau’s power extends over all earthly 
phenomena. Their rituals also recall Frazer’s descriptions of “early societies,” who 
exhibit an “attitude of lowliest prostration before the mysterious powers of the unseen” 
(Frazer 57). Frazer goes on to say that “the divine person is a source of danger as well as 
of blessing; he must not only be guarded, he must also be guarded against” (173). 
Similarly, Moreau inspires both fear and awe in his supplicants. The Beasts avoid the 
House of Pain, remembering the torture they endured there, and, as Moreau relates to 
Prendrick, they “all dread this house and [him] (59).” Moreau’s isolation from his people 
resembles the Divine Kings of Golden Bough, who Frazer asserts must “live in a state of 
seclusion” to ensure others’ safety (166). In other ways as well, Moreau demonstrates 
Frazer’s argument that “human gods…are obliged to observe many rules to ensure their 
own safety and that of their people” (217). Moreau goes to great lengths to prevent the 
Beasts from ever seeing him in a position of vulnerability. When Prendrick requests that 
he and Montgomery put their hands up as they walk away from him, Montgomery flatly 
refuses, “with an explanatory nod over his shoulder” to indicate that the Beast Folk must 
not see them in a subordinate position (Wells 69). The burden of authority prevents the 
men from ever exhibiting “undignified” behavior, just as Frazer’s divine kings “must be 
so regulated that no act of his, voluntary or involuntary, may disarrange or upset the 
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established order of nature” (Frazer 134). Bound by this philosophy, Moreau and 
Montgomery are forced to wage a constant battle in order to retain their power. This 
battle is necessary, because as Frazer contends, “primitive peoples…believe that their 
safety and even that of the world is bound up with the life of one of these god-men” 
(228). This “savage philosophy” is indicative of a society living in the Age of Religion. 
Wells’s depiction of the Beast Folk illustrates this theory, while also presenting a 
scenario of what ramifications might ensue should this worldview crumble. Just like the 
“savages” of Frazer’s description, Wells’ Beast People organize their worldview around 
certain “Fixed Ideas,” which assert that “certain things [are] impossible, and certain 
things [are] not to be done” (80). These premises form the foundation of the Beast Folk’s 
reality, and are intended to reinforce Moreau and Montgomery’s authority. But when 
Beasts first question the validity of these ideas, we watch as they begin their rapid 
transition out of the Age of Religion and into the Age of Science. In this way, the Beast 
Folk mimic mankind’s natural progress along the lines presented in Frazer’s version of 
stadial history. The beginning of their enlightenment is illustrated in the dialogue 
between the Ape Man, the Satyr Man, and Montgomery, in which the Beasts remark 
upon the inconsistency between Prendrick’s physical vulnerability and ignorance, and 
their Fixed Ideas, which contend that men like Montgomery and Moreau are not subject 
to the same earthly laws that govern the Beasts. Speaking to Montgomery, the Satyr Man 
looks “curiously” at Prendrick and remarks, “Yesterday he bled and wept…You never 
bleed nor weep. The Master does not bleed nor weep” (86). This observation is another 
instance of blood’s special function in Island of Dr. Moreau. The taste of blood is enough 
to persuade the Beasts to forsake the Law—suggesting that animal instinct persists 
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despite efforts to suppress it—yet blood also sparks the Beasts powers of rationality. 
Blood ushers the Beasts into the Age of Science while simultaneously bringing about the 
collapse of their civilization. Regarding Prendrick, the sight of his blood forces the Beasts 
to reassess their conception of reality. Their quest for truth is thwarted by Montgomery, 
however, who responds to their comments with threats and impatience. Acting as 
obstacles to the Beasts’ enlightenment, Moreau and Montgomery demonstrate how 
religion enforces a rigid version of reality, and how, wielded in the hands of a privileged 
minority, belief systems can serve as a means of oppressing the ignorant masses.  
Despite Moreau’s efforts, the Beast Folk are confronted with the hollowness of 
his Fixed Ideas upon his death, thus completing their accession into the Age of Science. 
In this way, Moreau symbolizes the Divine King in death as well as life. His death 
corresponds with Book II of The Golden Bough, “Killing the God,” in which Frazer 
rationalizes the reasons for which “primitive peoples” are motivated to kill their deified 
leader. According to Frazer, divine kings must die an early and violent death so that their 
soul can be transferred to a successor at its prime, rather then after the soul has decayed 
from old age or disease. These measures are necessary to prevent the king’s death from 
destabilizing the natural order. In Island of Dr. Moreau, however, we see the outcome 
that these measures intend to avert. The Beasts reveal the impact Moreau’s death has 
upon their worldview to Prendrick, as they look to him for verification and ask “Is there a 
Law now?” (103). Fearing in this way the implications his death has upon their existence, 
the Beast Folk’s uncertainty reflects the “savage philosophy” of Frazer’s description as 
they struggle to revise their belief system. Prendrick’s response to the situation, on the 
other hand, is a return to the narrative that Frazer outlined: he insists that Moreau’s soul 
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remains in another form, thus sustaining the illusion while also using the exact rhetoric 
found in “Killing the God.” “He has changed his shape –he has changed his body,” 
Prendrick informs the Beast Folk, going on to claim that Moreau “cast away” his body 
“because he had no more need of it” (104). Prendrick’s argument is reliant upon Frazer’s 
logic that the divine king’s soul can be transferred to a “vigorous successor” (235). In this 
case, the vessel of choice for Moreau’s soul is Prendrick himself, who the Beast Folk 
elevate to the position of the new Divine King, calling him “Master” as they once called 
Moreau. The very plot of Island of Dr. Moreau, as these examples illustrate, is molded 
around one of the central tenets of The Golden Bough. 
In stark contrast to Wells, T.S.  Eliot read The Golden Bough as an affirmation of 
his Christian faith. Quoted as calling Frazer “unquestionably the greatest master,” Eliot 
acknowledged his debt to The Golden Bough explicitly in his notes accompanying The 
Waste Land. Lionel Kelly further illuminates Frazer’s influence on the poem in his essay, 
“‘What are the roots that clutch?’: Eliot’s The Waste Land and Frazer’s The Golden 
Bough,” in which he argues that Eliot venerated Frazer as an “authority,” whose 
comparative framework served to substantiate his own religious conviction. Kelly’s 
analysis sheds light on how Eliot, a self-identified Christian, could find meaning in 
Frazer’s rationalist interpretation of human history. For while Frazer sets forth the 
universality of myths as evidence that religious development occurs everywhere in the 
same sequence, Eliot viewed the parallels between Christ and the Dying God trope as a 
sign of Christianity’s historical continuity. Kelly’s interpretation is in accordance with 
Vickery, who argues that in The Waste Land, Eliot invokes a  “religious consciousness” 
in the minds of even the most primitive societies. For Eliot, The Golden Bough, which he 
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praised for “throwing its light on the obscurities of the soul from a different angle,” 
suggests an innate religious impulse, even in man’s earliest stages of cultural evolution  
(Vickery 236).  
To demonstrate Frazer’s influence on popular imagination in the late Victorian 
era, one need only refer to contemporary press reports. Beginning with the publication of 
the first volume of The Golden Bough in 1890, journals ranging from The Academy, The 
Nation, The Dial, The Edinburgh Review, The North American Review, The Athenaeum, 
and The Living Age all carried critical reviews of Frazer’s work7. His fame only 
accelerated throughout his lifetime: In 1940, The Golden Bough competed with Mein 
Kampf for best-selling nonfiction book8, and in 1962, decades after Frazer’s death, 
Malinowski called The Golden Bough “a work known to every cultured man, a work 
which has exercised paramount influence over several branches of learning and has 
created new lines of scientific research” (Downie 57). Frazer was not isolated to a single 
demographic, however. His writing was accessible enough to serve as a liaison between 
Oxbridge academics and laypeople. Jane Harrison, a fellow classicist of Frazer’s at 
Cambridge, illustrates his pervasiveness with this anecdote: “A cultured policeman…said 
to me, ‘I used to believe everything they told me, but, thank God, I read The Golden 
Bough, and I’ve been a free-thinker ever since’”(Downie 64). 
In a 1962 essay for Varieties of Literary Experience, the critic Lionel Kelly noted, 
“Perhaps no book has had so decisive an effect upon modern literature as Frazer’s” 
(Downie 64). Yet though many scholars have tracked Frazer’s cultural impact, far less 
                                                
7 Downie, Robert Angus. Frazer and The Golden Bough. London: Gollancz, 1970. 
8 Beard, Mary. “Frazer, Leach, and Virgil: The Popularity (and Unpopularity) of the Golden Bough.” 
Comparative Studies in Society and History, Vol. 34, No. 2 (Apr., 1992), pp. 203-224. 	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attention has been devoted to Frazer’s effect on literature. One literary critic engaged in 
this study, however, is John B. Vickery, who since the 1970’s has studied the relationship 
between The Golden Bough and Modernist writers such as T.S. Eliot, D.H. Lawrence, 
James Joyce, and W. B. Yeats. According to Vickery, these authors found inspiration in 
Frazer’s discussion of myths and ritual, and saw myth creation as a powerful creative 
force in the human imagination. This perspective on myth and ritualism was only 
possible once anthropology and religion were framed in the context of scientific inquiry. 
Frazer was thus the herald of a new, empirical perspective of myth and ritualism, filling 
the void between academia and the popular imagination. Were it not for the influence of 
science, history, and an evolutionary vision of the past, Vickery argues, “myth would 
have remained an airy fancy with no social or psychological relevance to modern man” 
(Vickery 5). To many writers, myth fulfilled a “psychic need” in modern man, a need that 
thousands of years of civilization could not dampen. Myths therefore served a vital 
purpose, forming a bridge between the ancient savage and his oppressed, disillusioned 
descendants.  
Further contributing to Vickery’s legacy is Robert Fraser, editor of a recent 
abridgement from Oxford World Classics of the second and third editions, as well as Sir 
James Frazer and the Literary Imagination: Essays in Affinity and Influence. In the latter 
text, Fraser presents a collection of critical essays that demonstrate Frazer’s influence on 
writers like Joseph Conrad, John Buchan, and Wyndham Lewis, as well as the modernists 
cited above. Like Vickery, Fraser perceives a common discursive thread in these writers’ 
literature evoking Frazer’s conception of society in its primitive stages, and he traces how 
the mythic narratives recurrent in this collective body of literature are employed to 
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inspire in contemporary readers a sense of their own innate primitivism. While the 
objective of this paper pertains to Frazer’s influence on Wells, the work of the 
aforementioned critics provides a model for how The Golden Bough’s impact has been 
gauged in the past.  
W.B. Yeats is credited as being the first modern writer to assimilate Frazerian 
material into his literature. His 1899 poem “The Valley of the Black Pig” draws upon the 
myth of the Corn-god, which Frazer explicates in a chapter entitled “The Corn-Spirit as 
an Animal” in Book II of The Golden Bough. Yeats cites specific pages of Book II as he 
compares the black pig of Celtic legend with “the boar that killed Adonis, the boar that 
killed Attis; and the pig embodiment of Typhon.”9 Clearly, Yeats is employing Frazer’s 
material as well as his comparative method; far from being exclusive to one myth, Yeats 
presents the symbol of the boar as a universal trope with roots extending to diverse and 
distant lands. Alongside this summary of the Corn-Spirit is for how taboos arise: “The 
pig seems to have been originally a genius of the corn, and, seemingly because the too 
great power of their divinity makes divine things dangerous to mortals, its flesh was 
forbidden to many eastern nations.” Yeats’ rationale for the taboo’s purpose relies upon 
Frazer’s theory of prohibitions serving as insulators, separating mortals from the divine 
power that can jump, through contact, from person to person. Using equally Frazerian 
language, Yeats goes on to explain how the meaning of this taboo progressed from sacred 
to profane: “…but as the meaning of the prohibition was forgotten, abhorrence took the 
place of reverence, pigs and bears grew into types of evil, and were described as the 
enemies of the very gods they once typified.” Here, Yeats situates the Corn-Spirit myth 
                                                
9 The Variorium Edition of the Poems of W.B. Yeats, eds. Peter Allt and Russell Alspach (New York: 
Macmillan, 1957), p. 809. 
 39 
and accompanying taboo within an evolutionary perspective of human history, an 
approach he borrowed from Frazer. Vestiges of ancient superstition linger in modern 
societies, Yeats is implying, and cloud the judgment of its members. 
Yet as the anthropological perspective indicates, ancient superstition can be offset 
by objectivity. The taboo against cannibalism is so ingrained in the Time Traveler 
himself that several days pass following his initial glimpse of the Morlocks’ peculiar 
meat before he realizes its origin. His revelation occurs in a moment of keen insight 
during a spot of stargazing, when, using an anthropological perspective as his lens, he 
contrasts the “gravities of terrestrial life” against the “unfathomable distance” of the 
cosmos (70). As his thoughts wander, the Time Traveler marvels at the massive cosmic 
scale against which all of existence must be measured: 
And during these few revolutions all the activity, all the traditions, the complex 
organizations, the nations, languages, literatures, aspirations, even the mere 
memory of Man as I knew him, had been swept out of existence. Instead were 
these frail creatures who had forgotten their high ancestry, and the white Things 
of which I went in terror. Then I thought of the Great Fear that was between the 
two species, and, for the first time, with a sudden shiver, came the clear 
knowledge of what the meat I had seen might be. Yet it was too horrible! (71) 
The movements of the cosmos dwarf the entire spectrum of human history. Inspired by 
this sense of relativism, the Time Traveler views the Eloi and Morlock in terms of 
species, rather than vestiges of his own culture. It is this at this moment, when any trace 
of cultural context has been overlooked, that the Time Traveler can at last grasp a concept 
as alien to him as cannibalism. Quick on the heels of his revelation, however, is a 
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returning notion of taboos. This instance demonstrates clearly how an anthropological 
perspective enhances recognition by eliminating the interference of cultural norms. 
Hopelessly ensnared in their respective otherworlds, the odds appear low that 
either Prendrick or the Time Traveler will live to see England again. Just when their 
prospects seem bleakest, however, good fortune and a survivalist mentality conspire to 
ensure each man’s safe return. The Time Traveler eludes the “clinging hands” of the 
Morlocks in one “last scramble” at the White Sphinx before being ferried off aboard his 
time machine, while Prendrick finds salvation in a corpse-filled lifeboat from the very 
ship that deserted him. The protagonists’ abrupt removal from the otherworlds effectively 
concludes the inner narrative—an ending that recalls Wells and Frazer’s descriptions of 
human sacrifices. Yet though the uncertainty of each man’s position generates tension for 
the plot, this tension does not waver following their escapes, and persists, unabated, as 
each man attempts a transition back into his former cultural context. Their hasty 
departures deprive the inner narrative of a resolution; the otherworld is left behind 
abandoned and on the brink of collapse, permanently poised in a state of perpetual 
instability. 
This final image of instability begs the question: does an anthropological 
perspective somehow prevent a narrative from achieving resolution? The answer is yes, 
when the focus of this perspective is a culture founded on Frazer’s theories of primitivism 
and taboo. Taboos develop as a method for restricting people’s behavior, thereby 
removing some of the guesswork from social interactions by ensuring a degree of 
predictability. Such predictability is reassuring; in a world of chaos and senseless events, 
taboos maintain the illusion that a pattern exists determining the order of events, creating 
 41 
a sense of stability. In the worlds of Wells’ imagination, however, taboo-breaking is 
inevitable, and produces total societal upheaval. The consequences of taboo violations 
suggest that taboos are a risky system for organizing society, and that, achieved in this 
way, stability is unsustainable.  
Although Wells highlights the vulnerability of taboo systems, neither novel offers 
an alternative system for organizing society, a characteristic that distinguishes Wells’ 
early scientific romances from the overt didacticism of The Outline of History. The 
problem, according to Wells, is that taboos are an integral structural element of 
civilization: viewed along a developmental scale, every society is a chaos of confusion 
feebly buttressed by its precepts and prohibitions, which arise, metastasize and become 
ingrained until they too are eventually discarded. The Time Machine ends with the 
anonymous narrator arguing a similar point, referring to the “growing pile of civilization” 
as “only a foolish heaping that must inevitably fall back upon and destroy its makers in 
the end” (90). The narrator’s philosophy exhibits all the trademarks of an anthropological 
perspective, summarizing a topic as broad as the unilinear development of civilization 
with the detachment of an outside observer. His philosophy is also a concise rendering of 
stadial history, albeit with the addition of a final stage in which degeneration occurs. The 
only pattern governing society, the narrator suggests, is this senseless accumulation of 
social constructs, which can only end by way of total destruction. 
This template for regressive societal development is what Wells suggests his 
reader use to fill in the blank left behind by his narrative’s abrupt conclusion. We last 
glimpse our Wellsian otherworlds in the grips of this last stage of development, 
degeneration, the only form of conclusion a narrative can achieve when it is observed 
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through the lens of the anthropologist. The Time Traveler acknowledges his role as 
eyewitness to regression when he muses on the stadial history of Eloi society in the 
millennia preceding his visit, at which point “the balanced civilization that was at last 
attained” reached its “zenith,” before deliquescing to become what he sees in 801,702 as 
the “sunset of mankind” (63)(50). Our protagonist observes the arc of civilization even 
better from the vantage point of his time machine. On both legs of the journey, stadial 
history is enacted before his eyes. The progress he observes en route to 801,702, with 
“great and splendid architecture rising” about him, contrasts with the terrifying visions of 
further distant futurity, of a “desolate beach”  (43)(85). Measured against the passage of 
innumerable millennia, the age of humankind dwindles to a microscopic point on an 
infinitely long timescale.  
Comparing human history against the cosmos reminds the reader of that old 
chestnut, cultural relativism. The anthropological perspective provides the lens through 
which cultural relativism is brought into focus, functioning as both a telescope to view 
the cosmos, or a microscope to take in every minute detail of human existence. This 
flexibility is significant to Wells’ purposes. During a night in the forest, the telescopic 
lens helps the Time Traveler escape his present troubles by directing his gaze skyward: 
“Looking at these stars suddenly dwarfed my own troubles and all the gravities of 
terrestrial life. I thought of their unfathomable distance, and the slow inevitable drift of 
their movements out of the unknown past into the unknown future” (71). A telescopic 
lens effectively removes the Time traveler from his dangerous predicament, and stifles 
his sense of space and time; detachment becomes a source of comfort.  
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In The Island of Dr. Moreau, Prendrick experiences a similar sense of detachment 
when he trains a microscopic lens on the Beast folk. Observing their petty struggles, 
Prendrick views Beast culture as “the whole balance of human life in miniature, the 
whole interplay of instinct, reason, and fate, in its simplest form” (167). Prendrick’s 
revelation does not offer him any solace, however; through this lens, human existence is 
enshrouded in an “aimless wantonness”  (167). And yet, the oscillation between large and 
small lenses produces varying insights into the same subject, further emphasizing how a 
flexible perspective can make the viewer aware of his own relativism. 
Yet as both novels demonstrate, once one is restored to his original context, 
awareness is not as useful, and an anthropological perspective becomes a handicap. Each 
protagonist suffers an uneasy transition from his Wellsian otherworld back to British 
quotidian, and finds himself unable to remove the lens of objectivity as he perceives his 
external world. What once was familiar is now foreign; what once was alien is now 
commonplace. The Time Traveler articulates this inverted dichotomy back in his sitting 
room, as he relates his adventures to a cluster of dubious companions: “I know that all of 
this will be absolutely incredible to you. To me the one incredible thing is that I am here 
tonight in this old familiar room” (87). The verbal distinction between him and them, 
between “to you” and “to me,” is an acknowledgment of the disparity between his and 
their perspectives. Time Traveler knowingly stands in opposition to his friends. Yet as he 
soon discovers, clashing perspectives can generate internal dissonance. Restored to his 
former context, the combined pressures of “this room and you and the atmosphere of 
every day” cast into doubt the validity of his memories. Struggling to recollect his 
experience among the Eloi with clarity, he questions his perception of reality, and is 
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grieved to discover that his new perspective cannot be aligned with his old environment: 
“They say life is a dream, a precious poor dream at times—but I can’t stand another that 
won’t fit. It’s madness” (88). The effects of estrangement linger on, forcing the Time 
Traveler to choose between insanity and denial if he wishes to resume his former life. 
Prendrick, too, never sheds a sense of estrangement from his surroundings upon 
returning home to England. Unable to remove an anthropological lens, he feels detached 
from the social and cultural milieu, and perceives his fellow men with punishing 
objectivity. From his detached standpoint, Prendrick feels acutely aware of the 
similarities between contemporary society and the Beast Folk, leading him to fear that 
here in England, “the degradation of the Islanders will be played over again on a larger 
scale” (205). Informing Prendrick’s consideration of different “scales” is his sense of 
cultural relativism, which employs multiple frames of reference for the purpose of 
comparison. Thus, using language that echoes of the Beast Folk, Prendrick remarks on 
the “prowling women” and “furtive craving men” he passes on the city streets, none of 
whom he believes possess the “calm authority of a reasonable soul” (205). In the 
unflattering light of cultural relativism, civilized and primitive societies are rendered with 
equivalent impartiality, and so Prendrick interprets a preacher as “gibber[ing] Big Thinks 
even as the Ape Man had done” (206). Regardless of context, an anthropological 
perspective observes the same basic elements underlying every culture.   
Yet an anthropological perspective comes at a heavy cost; sensitive to the flaws of 
his old environment, Prendrick “withdraw[s] [himself] from the confusion of cities and 
multitudes,” and devotes his attentions instead to the study of chemistry and astronomy 
(207). His self-seclusion indicates that he has surrendered a participatory role within any 
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cultural context. Isolated from society, Prendrick exists solely as a lens, expanding and 
contracting to accommodate different frames of reference—hence his investment in 
chemistry, which measures the microscopic, alongside astronomy, a study scaled against 
the infinite. Prendrick’s separation from public life suggests that an objective perspective 
corresponds with a negation of the self: an anthropological perspective possesses a 
mirror-like quality that reflects back the object of scrutiny, while its impervious surface 
resists penetration from the constraints or obligations of a norm-injunctive society. This 
portrait of a detached viewer is reminiscent of Frazer’s vision of the ideal anthropologist, 
who observes with the “openness of a mind unwarped by preconceived notions and 
foreign conclusions” (xxxi). Yet the termination of Prendrick and the Time Traveler’s 
narratives illustrates the impossibility of Frazer’s ideal. No observer can ever exist in a 
vacuum; the observer must be present in the context, and yet detachment by definition 
requires severing ties with any cultural institution. The only way by which Wells could 
end either narrative on a note of authenticity was with this evasive technique, in which 
the two protagonists avoid reconciling perspective with culture.  
Though self-segregation is a welcome recourse for the detached character, Wells 
is careful to note that the outer group can enforce isolation as well, in the form of social 
ostracism. Prendrick and the Time Traveler cannot readjust to their social environments, 
and their refusal to comply with social norms drives a wedge between them and their 
peers. The inner narratives are met with arrant disbelief in the outer framework of each 
novel. Realizing that “no one would believe [him],” Prendrick learns to refrain from 
disclosing the facts of his yearlong hiatus for fear of being thought insane (204). The 
Time Traveler’s tale is met with equal skepticism. His audience of well-heeled 
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professionals refuses to countenance a phenomenon as unfamiliar as time travel. While 
the Medical Man advises his friend to abstain from overwork, the Editor voices stronger 
opposition, and dismisses the whole tale as a “gaudy lie” (89). Coupled with their 
lukewarm response to the Time Traveler’s first demonstration in the opening scene, the 
audience’s uncompromising skepticism demonstrates a general resistance to the 
unfamiliar. In their eyes, time travel represents a violation of natural law, which, if true, 
threatens to dismantle the group’s present conception of reality. By proposing an 
alternative framework for imagining natural law, the Time Traveler represents an 
irreconcilable conflict of perspectives. The only way to suppress this threat is to deny its 
existence; hence the “absolute silence” with which the group follows their host back from 
the laboratory, and their subsequent mass exodus from the home (89). Out of this episode 
emerges the idea that society resists crediting an anthropological perspective, for fear of 
what its objective lens might reflect back, should the society itself come under the 
microscope.  
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